Children are notoriously inequity averse: they tend to respond negatively when someone else receives more than them for the same work. Here we suggest that children's inequity aversion is more nuanced than it might appear at first glance. Specifically, we argue that children's negative reaction to inequity is powerfully shaped by a simple factor: whether or not they have a sense of agency in creating the outcomes in question. We hypothesize that a sense of agency, or control over the resource allocation, reduces children's inequity aversion and increases their satisfaction with another child receiving more than them. In two experiments (N = 417) utilizing a within-subject design, children aged 4 to 10 years old were asked to rate their satisfaction with an allocation in which another child received more than them. In one condition they were the ones choosing the allocation (“agency condition”), whereas in another condition they could not affect the allocation (“no-agency condition”). In line with our hypothesis, children reported being more satisfied with disadvantageous inequity when they had agency than when they did not (Experiment 1). They were also more satisfied with a disadvantageous allocation when they had agency than when the same allocation was created using an impartial lottery (Experiment 2). The agency effect did not depend on age. Taken together, our findings suggest a degree of sophistication in children's reactions to inequity and provide a practical allocation tool that can be used by parents and educators.

Can deliberation increase charitable giving when giving is impulsive (i.e., a onetime small gift in response to an immediate appeal)? We conduct two studies in Israel
and Sweden to compare two forms of deliberation, unguided and guided, in their ability to decrease the singularity effect (i.e., giving more to one than many victims), often
evident in impulsive giving. Under unguided deliberation, participants were instructed to simply think hard before making a donation decision whereas participants in the
guided deliberation condition were asked to think how much different prespecified decision attributes should influence their decision. We find that both types of deliberation
reduce the singularity effect, as people no longer value the single victim higher than the group of victims.

Importantly, this is driven by donations being decreased under deliberation only to the single victim, but not the group of victims. Thus, deliberation affects donations negatively by overshadowing the affective response, especially in situations in which affect is greatest (i.e., to a single victim). Last, the results show that neither type of deliberation significantly reversed the singularity effect, as people did not help the group significantly more than the single victim. This means that deliberate thinking decreased the overall willingness to help, leading to a lower overall valuation of people in need.

Keywords: charity, singularity effect, deliberation, affect, identified victim